I Introduction
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has become increasingly interested in improving financial reporting. One such improvement that is under consideration involves greater use of technology to allow investors access to more data on a timelier basis 1 . The interest in interactive data (SEC, 2007) was followed by a committee report to the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2008) on improving financial reporting and called for increased use of corporate websites to provide information that is more current. The ultimate goal is to provide better information in a more continuous reporting environment. This report also includes a call for the increased use of XBRL-tagging (XBRL International) "… to facilitate the ability of investors to more easily access comparative arrays of company information (SEC, 2008 pg 3). The Global Ledger (XBRL-GL, XBRL International) consists of tags for transaction level information while the XBRL-FR (Financial Reporting) taxonomies consist of tags for traditional financial statement elements. The tagging of information down to the transaction level envisioned by the XBRL-GL (XBRL International ), would allow investors access to information about corporate activities down to the most detailed level. While current discussions do not call for information at this level of detail, groups have called for reporting of corporate information in a form that takes advantage of emerging technologies . With the ability of current technology to provide more detailed and current information, it is incumbent on academicians and practitioners to anticipate issues that would arise under these different reporting environments. Certainly an SEC mandate would provide a 1 Section 409 of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX, 2002) legislation seems to mandate this and probably requires technological solutions to achieve this level of disclosure. 4 more immediate path toward providing financial information that is machine readable and is more current.
The ability to provide a larger set of information about a firm on a timelier basis is a possibility. However, there are a number of issues that at a minimum need to be considered before these mandates are put in place. It is the purpose of this paper to look at the implications of this technology for investors, auditors, and managers. The next section will provide a more detailed look at characteristics that would define continuous reporting environments.. The ensuing section will discuss some implications for this type of reporting environment, including information usage, audit concerns, and the disclosure of sensitive information. Section IV will examine techniques that have been used to restrict access to sensitive detailed information from the US Census Bureau data. While the methods used by the Census Bureau do provide an approach to protect certain types of sensitive information there are certain differences that make their approaches incompatible with requirements to provide relevant information to investors.
Therefore the following section will look at alternative approaches to protecting sensitive data.
At the conclusion the paper will look at the implications of these methods and suggest some areas for further investigation.
II The Continuous Reporting / Assurance Environment Characteristics
If corporate websites become an important or the predominant vehicle to disclose information about the firm there are a number of variables that could be used to define important characteristics of the environment. These include the type of information disclosed, the level of detail, the time-lag, and the method of obtaining the information. This section will discuss each 6 deal of information about raw material purchases. If the type of information is expanded and provided in more detail it could be possible for investors to recreate the purchase activity for each raw material. This certainly describes a reporting environment that is not currently available, but could be supported with current technologies.
Time Lag
Another variable that describes what might be considered a primary characteristic of any continuous reporting environment is the time-lag between events and the ability to obtain information about the events. Under the current reporting environment financial information is reported at discrete points in time and contains aggregations of events that occurred within the period covered by the report. Thus quarterly financial reports contain a sales figure that includes events that occurred over the previous three months. Even if the quarterly report were available on the last day of the quarter it contains some events that were concluded ninety days prior to the release. Under a continuous reporting model the time-lag between events and the reporting or availability to obtain information about the event would be reduced; in the limit, to zero. If there is zero time between an event and its availability and is considered in conjunction with an increased level of detail then there would be essentially a reporting environment in which investors could obtain information about individual sales or purchases as they occur. This truly continuous reporting environment has some important implications for investors in terms of information they obtain.
Query Language
Such a truly continuous reporting environment would place investors in a very different position as they search for information to make their decisions. Under the current reporting environment investors are provided with what has been considered a complete set of financial information. Investors are free to search for additional information, but the standard financial reports have a familiar set of information and format. If firms disclose information that has a zero time-lag between occurrence and availability then it would no longer make sense to obtain traditional financial statements even if they reflect moment by moment changes. While this traditional financial report would probably be available the availability of a more detailed and expanded information set would require investors to formulate requests for information based on their perceptions of relevancy. This change from a standard report to a user developed report would require corporate websites to provide a query language. There are two distinct but related constructs of query languages that will impact the investors' ability to request information.
First is the structure of the query language. The structure allows users to formulate their questions in a format that is closer to natural language. For example, "What were sales for the company" as opposed to formulations that are closer to a language like SQL 2 . The second construct for a query language concerns the capabilities it has to manipulate data. Statistical capabilities would be included in this construct. For example, "What are average sales for company X" requires the query system to do a statistical calculation. A second type of capability the query system would need are time constructs. Investors must be able to indicate a time frame and so references such as "last quarter" or even "yesterday" might be allowed 3 . These constructs of a query language, structure and capabilities, are primary determinants of the investors' ability to obtain information in a continuous reporting environment.
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This section has looked at four variables, expanded data set, more detail transaction level information, time lag between event and availability, and query language constructs, that would define any new reporting environment. The lag between the event and its availability is a central characteristic of any "continuous" reporting, but types of information and the method used to obtain this information also are important considerations in describing features of this environment. The next section will look at some of the audit and usage issues implied by changes in each of these characteristics.
III Issues for a Continuous Reporting Environment Information Use
If corporate websites become the predominant source of financial information, then the information becomes critical. Investors would be substituting traditional reports for web-based ones. Even if the financial report is unchanged, then a delay in disclosure would be critical as even alternative sources would presumably obtain their information from disclosures contained on the website. Under the current reporting model even quarterly financial report are anticipated and confirm investor expectations. The continuous reporting environment would not allow for this anticipation as information is released ever closer to the occurrence. These changes in the way information is disclosed means that concepts such as "insider trading", "materiality", and "adequate disclosure" would need some changes in their definition.
Adequate Disclosure and Insider Trading
While an occasional problem with a firm's website is currently an annoyance and may result in lost sales or dissatisfaction by trading partners, under a situation where investors' goals are to obtain data as a timely part an investment decisions, any delay in the ability to access a site 9 changes the disclosure of the information. As the time between the underlying business events and the availability of information about these events shrinks, a person with the ability to obtain the data would be in a very powerful position compared to someone who cannot, and an auditor faces a different set of problems. If there is a delay in reporting financial information because the website is inaccessible due to an intentional act, such as a denial of service attack, or accidental as with a technical problem, there is a problem of liability . Some questions that need thoughtful answers include:
• Has the firm taken adequate or reasonable steps to address technical problems that might hinder access to the website?
• If a person within the firm trades on information disclosed on the website and that information subsequently becomes unavailable, then is the person guilty of insider trading?
• When has the requirement for adequate website disclosure been met? After ten minutes without interruption? After one day?
• Must the disclosure be uninterrupted for the entire time period?
Cleary these questions need to be answered to provide auditors with guidance. At the minimum auditors will need an understanding of what methods can be used to make a website inaccessible and then decide whether the firm has taken reasonable steps to protect against these methods.
Even if the corporate website never has problems and the information is always available then the query system that responds to investor requests presents some audit issues. Under the current reporting environment firms have a clear understanding of their requirement to produce accurate information that is free of material errors. Investors looking at this information can pick which information to use, but the continuous reporting environment presents them with more options and opportunities. When the investor is confronted with a query system that allows/requires information requests from a corporate website, the ability to formulate questions or queries become an important issue.
Materiality Issues

Review of Queries
Previously the constructs necessary for a query language were identified. Each of these, language and capabilities, would provide an investor with the tools to request information from the firm's website. However, the auditor is faced with issues as the query system is now providing financial reports. Under this continuous reporting environment it is problematic for auditors to form opinions about each of these reports.
Materiality Determination
The auditor that is required to make materiality judgments looks at amounts disclosed in the context of the complete report. If investors are creating many individual reports different levels materiality would be implied. The information available to the investor depends on the specific characteristics of the continuous reporting environment; expansion of information to include non-GAAP items, the level of detail available, and time-lag. As these characteristics are extended, i.e. more non-GAAP items, more detail, and shorter time-lag the investor is faced with expanded options in terms of creating an individual report. The response to a query can be materially inaccurate in a number of ways:
• The translation of the request from the investor into a specific query could be inaccurate.
This could be because of a problem with an inappropriate translation of terms. For instance, an investor might ask for income when gross income was intended.
• The aggregation requested or time period might be misinterpreted; sales for the quarter instead of sales year to date or yesterday when the request is made from a different time zone.
• With the time-lag close to zero certain events are excluded from the response.
In each of these situations it is possible to conclude there is a material error in terms of a match between the intent of the query and the results provided. This is clearly a different definition of materiality. With the potential for a large number of individual queries the firm loses the ability to review all of the information released and an auditor loses the ability to review the appropriateness of the response to each query. This presents a problem for the auditor to decide whether each query fairly represents the request of the user and whether the response fairly represents the financial position of the firm in terms of the subset of data provided.
Query Translation versus Database Materiality
With a large number of continuously generated reports an auditor would be faced with determining materiality not of a set of numbers reported at a specific point in time, but a series of numbers reported at different points in time to different investors. The traditional approach of looking at the firm's database at a point in time is no longer available. In the zero time -lag continuous reporting model the corporate database is only current at the point of the request, not at the end of the quarter or fiscal year. The concept of overall materiality is lost. If the match between the users request and the information provided is not perfect, the auditor must first decide if this difference is material; again in the context of the individual report. The auditor must determine whether the problem resides in the way the user formulated their request, the translation of the request into the formal query language, or the subset of information provided.
Significant differences could occur at each point and an auditor in a continuous reporting environment could be faced with a materiality determination at any of them. Auditors would now be faced with a requirement to review the specific query language used in conjunction with the website; a very different level of responsibility. Firms would also be placed in a different relationship to investors. Under the current reporting environment financial information is disclosed after some level of review and interpretation by responsible individuals within the firm. This continuous reporting of financial information also changes the responsibility of the firm when it is not possible to perform a traditional review 6 .
With the most radical change from the current reporting environment, and one that is proposed by the Galileo Disclosure Model (Vasarhelyi and Alles), the amount of information disclosed becomes critical. This disclosure model includes access to more data, at a greater level of detail, and with zero time lags and requires a continuous determination of the completeness of the information provided. However, this environment presents another important issue; how much information should be disclosed. The next section discusses this new problem of keeping too much information from being disclosed.
Amount of Information Disclosed
The XBRL-GL taxonomies look to tag corporate information down to transaction level;
this would allow a reporting model in which detailed data is available. When transaction level detail is combined with a zero time-lag a truly continuous reporting environment is achieved.
Inventors and analyst probably could make a case that investment decisions would improve if they had more detailed information available, however there needs to be some review of the level of detail that should be available. If the available data expands to include all of the activities of the firm, investors that want to delve into the intricacies of the operations of the firm would benefit. The technology to move to such a situation is certainly within reach, but there needs to be a critical review of the amount of the information that will be provided and the query system that will provide the interface between investors and the underlying corporate data.
6 This problem was a major concern expressed by some corporate CFOs at the First Continuous Reporting 
Disclosure of Sensitive Information
If the reporting model changes to include more of the underlying detail, then a query system will have access to all of the firm's data. Rather than simply responding to any request for information, such a system must be able to balance the requests for information with the need to protect sensitive corporate information. The definition of "sensitive information" may be different depending on the group making the definition, but it is clear that knowledge about the critical activities of the firm needs protection to ensure success of the firm .
Definition of Sensitive Information
Once a precise definition of sensitive information has been made a related precise specification of when the sensitive information is released must also be made. This requires a
complete understanding of what information is actually needed to know the sensitive information . For instance, it may be critical to protect the exact sales for each of the company's locations (sensitive information). However, the level of sales for the company is not sensitive and should be available to investors. The problem is that in responding to queries about sales grouped by states or regions (or other types of groupings), if enough queries are asked then the value of sales for a particular store can be determined (Jonge, 1983) . Even responding inappropriately can provide unintended information . A response of, "That information cannot be provided," to a query asking whether a certain project is top secret will have the unintended consequence of providing the requested information. This desire to protect "sensitive" information would also expand audit issues as an auditor would need to be involved in determining what information should be termed "sensitive", the methods used to determine when this information has been disclosed, and the appropriateness of the techniques used to withhold this information. 
IV Learning from Queries on Statistical Data
The U.S Census Bureau and hospitals in the United States collect a great deal of information that is statistical in nature. The requirement for both datasets is similar; the information is generally available, but there is also a pledge of confidentiality (Office of Civil Each of these codes defines confidentiality as non-disclosure of individual responses. For census data, this would mean that an individual response would not be derivable with a specified degree of certainty from the presented data. For hospitals, the HIPAA requires that individual information not be disclosed to unauthorized individuals. Each of these requirements has parallels with a corporation that does not want to disclose certain information.
Census and Hospital Data
For Census data reports, the requirement is that there should not be any application of While these requirements are similar, the fundamental difference is that a user in a hospital with a specific role can create queries for individual health information which is considered sensitive, but the census data reporting system (American FactFinder, Hawala, Zayatz, & Rowland, 2004) must not permit this for any user. Another difference is that health statistics are reported much like traditional financial reports while Census data is accessed using a query system that creates individual reports. Thus hospitals protect sensitive information using the approach currently employed in reporting financial information, producing predefined reports, and so their methods for protecting sensitive data are not applicable to a continuous reporting environment.
Disclosure of Census Data
The disclosure of Census data is generally provided in a suppression. Perturbation involves the altering of the total value in a cell(s). Protection flow involves methods of perturbation so that the that totals (columns or rows) are preserved (Massel, 2004 (Massel, & 2005 .
Statistical Disclosure Controls
Insert Figure 1 In Figure 1 a constant x might be added to cell A and subtracted from cell C. This pertubation would maintain the general information about the row total, but would alter the column totals. To correct for this pertubation and maintain the column totals the constant x could be subtracted from cell M and added to cell O. Other pertubation methods have been
proposed that allow for analysis that maintains statistical relationships (Dinur & Nissim, 2003) .
The suppression of cells is generally done to to protect the confidentiality when a small number of respondents fit into a specific category Data in the transaction level zero time-lag continuous reporting environments has some parallels with the census data. If the current reporting categories are used, then protection levels may not be as important, however as more detailed information becomes available there is a question of how much detail should be disclosed. Some issues such as legal requirements , or competitive reason would assist in determining the information that should not be disclosed. While the direct disclosure of the sensitive information could be blocked the level of detail could allow inferences to be made even if the data is not provided in tables with row and column totals. Two approaches to making inferences from data are time and set intersection methods.
Time Based Inferences
An organization's database changes over time as a result of both internal and external events. Someone familiar with the timing of these events could infer certain information without actually creating a query for that data. For instance, a person that is aware of an anticipated hiring event could query the total salaries for a department before and after the event. By comparing the two amounts the person could infer the salary of the new hire. This inference would be possible even if the number or employees in the department were large enough so that cell suppression was not required. This inference is even possible without access to transaction level detail. This same approach could be used to infer purchases of raw materials, again without access to transaction level detail. As more detail is available it would be possible to infer not just raw material purchases, but purchases of specific items from specific vendors.
Intersecting Subset Inferences
Another approach to obtaining a salary of an individual in a department would be to ask for the salary information of all employees, then of all employees except the managers, and so on. Basically one might think of this as constructing a series of sets until the intersection becomes a single member. This ability to string together an unlimited number of queries has been shown to allow for access to all underlying detail (Jonge, 1983) . In a corporate setting this Deleted: For instance, a query about total payroll by division or department would result in a table similar one of the census data tables. To restrict discovery of data about individual salaries application of the same cell restriction methods could conceal salaries in departments with a small number of employees, but because of the different nature of corporate data, there are situations in which a user could still obtain information about individual data. For instance, if a user knew that a person was to be hired into a department, then running the query about departmental payroll before and after the hiring date would allow someone to infer the salary of the new hire even in a department where the number of employees made cell perturbation unnecessary. This is a problem with detailed zero time-lag data that someone with knowledge of the activities of the firm can make inferences about sensitive data without ever ... [3] process is assisted by knowledge such as the minimum salary for a manager, or that salaries cannot be negative, or the average number of employees in departments 7 .
In each of the examples, time based and intersecting subsets, sensitive information could be obtained even though the specific sensitive information was never requested. Users can keep track of the information provided and then use this information to infer sensitive information.
Therefore, restrictions must be placed on users to keep them from obtaining enough information to infer undisclosed sensitive information.
Restrictions to prevent inferences
The need to restrict queries to eliminate the ability to make inferences was recognized very early (Denning D. E., 1978; Denning and Denning, 1979; . The initial solution to maintain security with these types of queries, again depending on the level of security required, was not to respond to queries where the set size fell outside the range [k, n-k] for k ≥ 0 and n being the size of the database. The determination of k sets the count for legitimate queries and presumably eliminates responses to queries such as the Census data salary queries mentioned above 8 . While this approach can prevent disclosure of certain information, the ability to string together queries combined with some knowledge about the semantics of the corporate data can allow inferences about data that was supposed to be secure . In the case of small cell sizes the values can either be hidden or perturbed. However, there is another problem with the perturbation techniques used with census data.
7 Knowledge of other characteristics such as cardinalities (Zhang , Zhao & Chen, 2004) and related data (Yazdanian & Cuppens, 2003) has been shown to allow inferences in which sensitive information is thought to be protected.
8 This is essentially the approach used to determine when a cell should not be disclosed for a Census data report. There is a presumption that information beneficial to investors should be disclosed.
There could be a distinction between information investors want and the set of information that is required to make decisions. This discussion needs to be made in conjunction with management's specification of sensitive data. Current rules concerning disclosure preclude altering data, particularly in a way that would make it materially different from a true value. In fact if data were to be altered in a way unknown to investors then continuously reported information would essentially be useless. This is an important distinction between mandates to keep information secure versus any reporting mandate to provide useful information. It means that methods used to secure Census data may not be appropriate under a detail level zero timelag continuous reporting environment that uses corporate websites. The next section will look alternative approaches that could prevent inferences from disclosed data and overcome the problems of the perturbation methods of SDC.
V Query Inferences and Continuous Reporting
The statistical databases discussed in the previous section have certain functional relationships contained within the data itself. For instance, a table such as the one with total salaries by department and division would have totals that are functionally dependent on values from other cells. The cell perturbation methods discussed previously can prevent someone querying the database from using knowledge of the functional relationships to infer the value of certain cells. While this does prevent sensitive data from disclosure, it can also prevent certain types of analysis that might be of interest to potential users of the system. For instance, perturbing sales information might also prevent an analysis of average sales per store.
Any future mandate from the SEC for continuous reporting would probably look toward providing more data about the operations of the firm as this would be of interest to investment 
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Again u need a conceptual jump as there are tradeoffs here 21 decision makers. Dinur and Nissim (2003) , , and Steel (2004) present methods to preserve certain qualities of the data so that analysis can still be carried out. In order to allow the analysis, certain knowledge of the types of requests needs to be determined. The structure of financial reports does presume certain types of decisions and the usefulness of information for those decisions. However, as more detailed information becomes available there would need to be a much deeper understanding of the different inferences that can be made to make sure those inferences are preserved while keeping sensitive information from being disclosed. This analysis would also allow for the development of more directed methods to protect sensitive information while still disclosing the information beneficial to investors. There are two distinct methods to determine what the possible inferences from a set of queries. One is to maintain a query history and the other is to formulate inference channels .
Inference Channels
Staddon (2003) presents a method to develop inference channels and create encryption keys for objects within the channel. An inference channel can be conceptualized as a path of information that when traversed allows for a previously unknown piece of information to be inferred. In this approach, users are provided with tokens to query the database. When a user performs a query and obtains an object in the inference channel, a token is used. The set of available tokens is reduced, and thus information they can obtain is also reduced. The inference channel will not be compromised with appropriate allocation of tokens to users; as tokens will be used up before all of the objects in the channel are known. For instance, if there are eight pieces of information required to acquire a certain piece of sensitive information, then users will be supplied with seven tokens. In the manager salary example this would mean that a token would be used when total salaries were requested and then another when salary for a specific department and so on; the tokens would be used before the intersection became a single employee. This system can also be collusion resistant. As a sufficient number (sufficient can be determined by the possible connection of users and the sensitivity of the underlying data) of tokens have been used to query a specific object in the inference channel, the object is considered to be in the public domain and the token for this object will be considered used by all users. Thus, a user cannot preserve certain tokens, query other objects in the channel, and share that information. An inference channel protection scheme must be able to keep users from working in collusion by keeping a record of objects in the inference channel that have been
queried. An inference protection scheme is consider c-collusion resistant if c users working in collusion are unable to query all the objects in an inference channel.
Information Required for Inference Channels
To implement security based on the inference channels two different pieces of information must be determined.. The first is the identification of protected or sensitive information. Management must determine what knowledge needs protection and the level of protection. Secondly, the objects in the inference channel need specification. This requires a complete specification of the data, which once known will allow a user to infer the value of a sensitive piece of information. This scheme also assumes that the underlying database is static.
If one of the objects in the channel changes, a reevaluation of the tokens already used is required.
For instance, if one of the objects in the inference channel was the commission rate paid to salespeople and the rate changes then technically the person has not used the token for that object and it should be "refunded". The inability to refund tokens and the requirement to define the inference channel or path are drawbacks of this approach. A final drawback of the inference channel approach is the functional relationships within a firm's data. Information in a corporate database is correlated in many ways. Changes to accounts receivable is correlated to the level of sales which is correlated to the level of inventory and so on. Thus there may be alternative paths to sensitive information. With the inference channel approach, all of these alternative paths to the information also need protection. The method of assigning tokens to a channel would have to consider these correlated channels to protect any sensitive information. The level of correlation would need to be specified as for certain inferences a level of certainty may be quite sufficient. For instance, it may be sufficient to know planned purchases of raw materials within a few weeks. An alternative approach, the history approach, combined with an inductive learning system may prove to be a better solution to protecting sensitive information in a continuous reporting environment.
Inductive Learning and Query History
Asking questions and then combining the information obtained is a very natural way in which humans learn about the world. Inductive learning systems combine information to formulate different theories about the underlying systems providing the answers. A corporate information system that allows continuous reporting can be viewed similarly. The match is even more evident when the activities of the firm are the source of information, and the intent of an investor is to learn about the operations of the firm that are producing the data. The fact that the activities can be described functionally adds further support to this view. Production functions and purchasing decisions certainly fit into this model. An argument can be made that these functional relationships might be considered sensitive. For instance, the disclosure of a company's production function would allow competitors to anticipate purchasing activities and understand limits on prices. A continuous reporting system with access to individual transactions could allow a user to learn the underlying functional relationships in a firm in much Where di du get this whole thing? You have to find an easier way to explain and illustrate this for the JETA audience… do not copy from the query literature explain in brief terms and illustrate and refer to it exactly (author, date and page number) Deleted: to review information provided overcomes the requirement to specify all possible ways to infer a piece of sensitive information and the change to information of inference channels.
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Deleted: link is even more realistic when the Deleted: Certainly, Deleted: an 24 the same way that inductive learning systems can learn other types of functional forms. formally describe a learning system in which a passive learner gathers observations from a natural system. Under this model of learning, the observer reformulates their representation/hypothesis of the function that governs the behavior of the system. While the observer can never prove that the function generating the data matches their hypothesized function, as more observations confirm their hypothesis they become more certain that their view is correct. All it takes to reject their hypothesis (or to reformulate it) is an observation that does not fit into the hypothesis. The revision process requires the learner to incorporate previous observations with each new observation. Stability occurs when the learner does not revise their hypothesis because of a new observation(s) . In each case, the learner is attempting to discover underlying functional relationships that are generating the data. For this type of system, the observer must decide which data to observe and to include in their hypothesis (re)formulation.
Continuous Reporting and Inductive Learning
A person obtaining information from a continuous reporting system faces a problem similar to an inductive learning system. The assumption of a passive learner is discarded in favor of an active model in which the investor/learner is requesting specific data (observations) to support their hypothesis or investment decision. In a continuous reporting environment the investor/learner makes a series of requests and then incorporates the results. The history of these continuous reports represents what the investor/learner can infer. While the inductive learning from the query history approach does not require knowledge of the users' intent, understanding the objective can help in determining the uncertainty required (Blum, et. al., 2008) . For instance, someone interested in timing raw material purchases to take advantage of demand swings may Therefore an intelligent investor that finds a unique inference channel cannot circumvent the protection management has placed on sensitive information. One deficiency of the inference channel approach was the problem of "refunding" tokens when the underlying information changed. This problem can be overcome by using strategies employed by dynamic search engines.
Query Histories and Dynamic Data
As a firm operates over time, data will change but there is a chance that certain functional relationships will not. Total sales will change, but the average sales or the gross margin percent might not. Thus inferences based on totals may no longer be valid while those based on averages or percents could still be valid. To identify specific queries that are no longer valid specific characteristics of the data already provided must be calculated. To make a query based continuous reporting system useable these changes must be monitored and their impact on query histories determined.
9 Keefe et. al. (1989) look at creating sensitivity levels within a database and reviewing query histories on those sensitive elements in the database. 
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Previous work on monitoring dynamic web pages use certain probability functions to determine whether a web page needs to be revisited. Their methods have been used to review information on changes to a hurricane's course and when weather websites need to be revisited.
Certainly, the stream of events that could change sales in a corporate database is more deterministic than the stream of events that could change a hurricane. Other approaches such as adding security constructs to cookie policies might also be able to determine when information is no longer valid (Shankar and Karlof, 2006) . Partitions to corporate databases along certain dimensions could identify the series of events that change information about sales or other sensitive objects with a high degree of certainty. Including mechanisms like these to delete invalid queries in the history would allow a continuous reporting system to answer previously blocked queries. Maintaining the query history can keep sensitive information from being disclosed. However, there are ways to alter the structure of the query system itself to augment the history approach and limit the types of inferences that can be made.
Altering the Capabilities of the Query System
Previously the characteristics of the query system were presented. Altering these characteristics can also restrict the ability of a learner/investor to discover structures of the underlying system. prove that query systems with certain capabilities have the learning potential (ability to learn certain functions) that is equivalent to passive induction inference machines. They show that by including (or removing) certain capabilities the query system can improve (or reduce) the learning capability as compared to the capability of a passive inductive learning machines. A simple example would be that by eliminating time parameters from a query system would eliminate a rather large set of information that could be obtained and therefore a large number of inferences that could be made. The removal of statistical capabilities would eliminate another large set of queries and again reduce the information that could be obtained. Another possible capability to remove would be the ability to ask join queries; sales organized by state 10 . have shown that including recursive queries will expand the learning capability of the system. Standard deviation of sales in a particular region for a particular time period is an example of such a query 11 . With each restriction in the capabilities of the query system itself certain types of information cannot be obtained and therefore inferences that depend on this information are eliminated. Thus combining an inductive learning query history approach with a query language that has a reduced set of capabilities can make it difficult 12 to obtain sensitive information.
Implications of Query History and Inductive Learning for Continuous Reporting
Much of the work in understanding how inferences can be made looks at how to build computational models of inductive learning. This work has focused on characteristics of learning systems , what it means to learn , and what it means to know . This work has implications for restricting access to sensitive information in a continuous reporting environment. First, the investor has a goal of learning about the underlying systems in the corporation. Second, the investor trys to obtain information that supports this goal. A continuous reporting system becomes the vehicle by which the investor interacts with the corporate information system. 10 This is a join query because the information about the state would require joining the sale to the customer and then grouping the sales by the state the customer lives in.
11 This is recursive because the results of a query are used in a subsequent query.
12 It might be tempting to conclude that removal of capabilities would make certain inferences impossible.
However, research has shown that methods thought to be completely secure in the end are only "partially" secure. Deleted: Altering the Structure of the Query System ¶ When an investor is requesting information corporate information from a database that contains transaction level data there are certain data elements and functional relationship that would be specified as sensitive. Maintaining a history of what has been disclosed can determine all inferences that can be made with the given set of data. However, altering the structure of the query system can also keep certain functional relationships from being divulged. prove that query systems with certain capabilities have the learning potential (ability to learn certain functions) that is equivalent to passive induction inference machines. However, by including (or removing) certain capabilities the query system can improve (or reduce) the learning capability as compared to passive inductive learning machines. For instance, the ability to ask recursive queries expands the learning capability of the system. What is the standard deviation of sales in a particular region for a particular time period is an example of such a query. In addition restricting the types of functions available to the system can prevent certain relationships from disclosure. This approach would be appropriate if all functional relationships within the set of secure information were 
Deleted:
13 . A query history could identify the series of events that change information about sales with a high degree of certainty. By identifying, the Deleted: systems Deleted: Deleted: ) , ... [5] ... [6] 28 Finally, the investor will ask for information until their view becomes stable; additional information does not change their understanding of the information system. There are two fundemental differences. The first is that the inductive learning model does not assume any prior knowledge of the underlying system to be learned. It could be learning a language for the first time. In a continuous reporting environment the assumption is that the user has some knowledge of the company. Investors understand revenues and expenses. The other difference is the inductive learning research is concerned with understanding the process, the goal of a continuous reporting system is to stop learning before sensitive information is disclosed. Neither of these differences would preclude the use of inductive learning to develop systems to protect sensitive information; in fact this approach has been used in static databases (Blum, Ligett and Roth 2008 and Nabar, et al. 2006) . Corporate databases do present a special challenge as the underlying database does change over time. This constant change makes it difficult to protect sensitive information and still provide new information under the inference channel approach. Another problem with inference channels is that not only the best path to the sensitive information must be understood, but also all possible paths. Query histories overcome these problems by looking at what can be inferred from the investor's set of queries.
V Summary and Conclusions
Under the current reporting environment investors must combine information from many different sources and make conjectures about their validity. Investors are continually interested in obtaining more information that is timelier. A continuous or real time reporting environment promises to address some of these issues. There are always technological advances that can implement these visions. Any enhanced reporting environment can be characterized by an increase in the amount of data, a higher level of detail, the time-lag between the event and it Deleted: between these systems and a system that would allow users to request information about a corporation and yet still keep from disclosing sensitive data.
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Deleted: Because the goal of the inductive learning system is to understand what can be learned from information provided it would seem to provide a better approach to protecting sensitive information in a continuous reporting environment.
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Deleted: s assume knowledge of the best way to combine information while query histories and inductive learning does not. This implies a model of security where managers define what knowledge should not be available as opposed to what data should not be disclosed.
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A page and a half paragraph.. ouch.. maybe here you want to in an organized way what you did and that will help you to fix the rest of the paper and ht eabstract.. the more I read it the more I like it but it is still a mess .. not a big huge mess as before… Deleted: has indicated interest in using corporate websites as a vehicle to disclose corporate information. This combined with a vision from the XBRL community for a continuous reporting environment requires academicians and practitioner to consider the implications of such an environment. On primary issue concerns the characteristics of such Deleted: the Deleted: the Deleted: and ... [7] availability, and finally the query system that creates the reports. The move toward real time reporting will affect participants in the reporting process.
This continuous reporting environment places additional pressure on investors, auditors, and managers. Investors, because in this environment they must create their own reports as opposed to simply accepting traditional ones. Their information usage promises to change and it becomes a new area of concern. Auditors, because they must be prepared to review both the adequacy of measures used by firms to make sure information is continually available and the materiality with respect to the system's response. Finally, managers because they must be prepared to deal with different types of disclosure of corporate information and will be required to determine what information should be considered sensitive.
A continuous reporting environment would allow users to make inferences about the operations of the firm in ways not envisioned in the current reporting environment. The potential ability to ask questions of operational data would mean that sensitive information could be inadvertently disclosed. Both the U.S Census Bureau and hospitals also face this challenge as users query their underlying data. The inferences possible from these queries are anticipated and restrictions are placed using statistical disclosure controls before the sensitive information is disclosed. There are some issues that make these SDCs not well suited for continuously reported corporate data and therefore other methodologies are explored. The use of inference channels and inductive learning systems with query histories offer some advanced capabilities to protect sensitive information. Certain characteristics of corporate information seem to make an inductive learning approach better suited to protect sensitive information. The major issue for practitioners and academics is to understand and make informed choices about these issues Deleted: systems that provide the information as opposed to the information itself. Issues such as disclosure take on a different meaning when the system to provide this disclosure is a website that can become unavailable. In addition materiality takes on a different meaning when there a many different user created reports as opposed on one general report. If the continuous reporting environment evolves into one in which detailed information becomes available on a zero time-lag bases the investor community will have to resolve issues such as what information is required, what is desired, and what should declared off limits because it would compromise the future of the firm. Given that this decision has been made, and this is certainly not a trivial endeavor, systems must be put in place to protect sensitive data from disclosure while still allowing disclosure of other information. There are basically two methods to keeping information secure while still providing users with the capability to use a query system to request information. The first is the inference channel approach which assigns tokens to each step in the chain of information required to make an inference. This is computationally easier but suffers from problems including correlated information and refunding of tokens for information that has changed. The query history approach is more complicated, but would allow for revisions based on a learning model. The emergence of new technologies and calls to use this technology to support the users of financial information requires an investigation not only of all the implications of these changes, but also possible approaches to alleviate some of the problems that might result. This paper has explored some of the characteristics of a continuous reporting environment. As with any new technology there are benefits to be gained as well a challenges to be considered. When an investor is requesting information corporate information from a database that contains transaction level data there are certain data elements and functional relationship that would be specified as sensitive. Maintaining a history of what has been disclosed can determine all inferences that can be made with the given set of data.
However, altering the structure of the query system can also keep certain functional relationships from being divulged. prove that query systems with certain capabilities have the learning potential (ability to learn certain functions) that is equivalent to passive induction inference machines. However, by including (or removing) certain capabilities the query system can improve (or reduce) the learning capability as compared to passive inductive learning machines. For instance, the ability to ask recursive queries expands the learning capability of the system. What is the standard deviation of sales in a particular region for a particular time period is an example of such a query. In addition restricting the types of functions available to the system can prevent certain relationships from disclosure. This approach would be appropriate if all functional relationships within the set of secure information were known, and therefore the lack of these capabilities in the query system would be sufficient to keep the information secure. However, the query system would also need to review the history of responses to be certain that the security requirements are maintained. For instance, the sales by region had already been disclosed.
To keep certain information secure the query system must be able to generate all functional relationships that can be derived from data that have already been provided.
This history of information provided, query results, determines what the user already knows about the underlying system. In order to keep information secure a query system must be able to stop responding if the user could use information provided in the next query to obtain information determined to be sensitive. Continuous reporting systems add another layer of complication to the learner trying to infer functional relationships.
In previous models of query systems, there was always an assumption that the underlying data or functional relationships were static. In a firm, this assumption might not hold, and this plays a key role in using the query history to keep sensitive information from being disclosed. 
